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After the failure of the South Stream pipeline project, is Russia’s energy inﬂuence over
Europe diminishing? Jarosław Wiśniewski argues that it is vital to recognise the role of foreign
and security politics in energy projects, rather than simply focusing on their economic eﬀects. He
writes that energy initiatives have been used by Russia to create particular geopolitical narratives,
which is now evident in the way Gazprom is promoting a planned new pipeline, ‘Nord Stream 2’,
between Russia and Germany.
Several factors have led observers to believe that Moscow’s dominance over European energy
markets is bound to take a downward turn: the collapse of the South Stream pipeline, the economic sanctions
imposed on Russia, the American shale gas revolution, and the increased availability of liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG).
Such reﬂections, however, ignore that energy has long ceased to be merely economy-oriented, and that energy
measures are increasingly becoming part and parcel of foreign and security policies.
Seen through the lens of an economist, various energy initiatives can indeed appear unproﬁtable. This is why
constructing a narrative, elaborating a certain way of ‘explaining’ or ‘selling’ the story, is becoming even more
important than engaging in discussions about the economic viability of various projects. Next to the long list of
agreements, memoranda, deals and counter-deals, the history of EU-Russia relations is, ultimately, a history of
competing narratives, and each initiative therefore requires a certain storyline. The term ‘storyline’ refers to the
events that a piece of prose conveys, be they real or ﬁctional. These events are usually neither good nor bad in
themselves.
Let us take the example of the 2006 energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine, when Russia cut the supply of gas
ﬂowing through the pipelines across the Ukrainian territory. The events themselves did not tell the observer anything
about Russia’s motives, i.e. was there any reason behind it? Was it somehow justiﬁed? The story in itself refers to
the basic event. The meaning is attached to it through the art of storytelling, and the starting point is the plot. Coming
up with a plot is a relatively simple exercise.
A recent case in point to consider is the latest virtual pipeline, Nord Stream 2. This project was agreed upon during
the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on 4 September 2015, when representatives of Gazprom, BASF, E.ON,
ENGIE, OMV and Shell signed a Shareholders’ Agreement on the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
nominally to ‘enhance supply of natural gas to the European Union’s market ’. The agreement foresees the
construction of two pipelines (aggregate capacity of 55 bcm per annum) running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to
Germany. According to Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller, the plan is to make Nord Stream 2 operational by the end of
2019.
Figure: Map of the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline route
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Note: Image reproduced from the project’s oﬃcial website.
The creation of the storyline follows these ﬁve steps. First of all we need actors, ideally both good (protagonist: the
consortium made of the Russian energy suppliers and the EU energy recipients) and evil (antagonist: the transit
countries, i.e. Ukrainians and their supporters). The protagonist must be confronted with a problem.
Second, the protagonist needs to have the willingness or motivation to act and to be ready to make ‘diﬃcult’
decisions in order to solve the ‘problem’. The Nord Stream 2 website provides a very neat outline of the problem,
deﬁned as follows: ‘the EU needs secure gas resources in the long term in order to ensure global industrial
competitiveness and meet domestic demand’. It also sets out the solution: ‘as a European neighbour with some of
the world’s largest known reserves, Russia is a key supplier of natural gas to Europe’.
Third, the story needs to have a certain time frame. It requires a clear beginning, as well as a vision of when it will
end. We ﬁnd a temporal indications in the statement: ‘the overall gas demand in the European Union in the coming
decades can only be met by further increasing imports from outside the EU’.
Fourth, a simple story has to be linear. Using ﬂashbacks, however, can help shape the protagonist (Russia as a
reliable supplier with a strong track record; ‘successful Nord Stream’). To be convincing, the story also needs
obstacles, such as a need for energy and the need for ‘reliable and secure transport options’, i.e. bypassing
unreliable transit countries (read: Ukraine). It needs challenges the protagonist needs to face in order to solve the
problem.
Finally, the story needs a conclusion, a moral, which is here articulated as ‘a long-term solution for the EU’s energy
security’. The storyteller has to pay careful attention to the language used. It needs to be clear and unambiguous,
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plainly suggesting who is the hero and who is the villain. In this case, some of the key elements that require a very
precise articulation are: Russia as a reliable partner; the successful past cooperation; the use of the keyword
‘diversiﬁcation’ in a way that suggests the diversiﬁcation of routes, and not of the sources.
In the end what is produced is a narrative, a certain (subjective) account of connected events. This is a speciﬁc
sequence, which has its starting point, a ﬂow, and ﬁnally has an ending; but it is a narrative that is highly politicised.
The Russian side however claims otherwise, accusing Nord Stream 2 opponents of the politicisation of the debate.
The most important aspect here is indeed language, and speciﬁcally the careful use of vocabulary. One of the most
frequently used words is ‘geopolitics’. Even though the use of this word has nothing (or very little) to do with the
actual academic concept, it is nevertheless an important keyword that allows the storytellers to escape stricter
scrutiny, which is precisely what the advocates of Nord Stream 2 are trying to achieve.
The potential success of this narrative is highly debatable. Nord Stream 2 will probably be blocked under the existing
EU competition rules, as already happened in the case of South Stream. It does however seem to exert a certain
inﬂuence over political decision-makers, who have, in certain cases, used it as an excuse in existing domestic
feuds, as the discord over this issue between the CDU and SPD in Germany clearly shows. It has also been
positively received by some experts: a paper by the Jacques Delors Institute argued that “this could be a strategic
moment to strike a comprehensive EU-Russia transit agreement on a coherent regime for all Russian import
pipelines to the EU, or at least ﬁnd individual solutions for every transit corridor”.
Opponents of the pipeline have focused on the absence of an economic justiﬁcation for the project and on its
irrelevance to EU policy goals. In his speech in October 2015, the EU’s energy commissioner Arias Cañete ﬁrmly
questioned Nord Stream 2’s ability to respond to the policy objective of diversiﬁcation of routes and sources: “as I
said before, there is overcapacity for the transport of gas from Russia. For these reasons the Nord Stream 2 project
cannot ever become a project of common interest. It cannot ever beneﬁt from EU ﬁnancing or EU support.”
Russia’s assertiveness is therefore not only seen in its actions, but is also visible in its narratives. These positions
are increasingly clashing with those of the West, as Judy Dempsey has recently observed. Nord Stream 2 is a great
example of how a very basic, and convincing storyline can be built and promoted.
Pipeline narratives are a part of Russia’s information warfare, as analysed by OSW’s Joanna Darczewska. In her
case study focused on ‘the Crimean operation’, Darczewska argued that the information warfare’s “distinctive
features are language (the language of emotions and judgments, and not of facts), content (compliance with the
Kremlin’s oﬃcial propaganda) and function (discrediting the opponent)”. This is hardly new or innovative, and has a
mixed success rate; most recently, a failure in the South Stream case, and a probable failure of Nord Stream 2 as
well. But it is undoubtedly set to continue.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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